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ABSTRACT

The lack of consistent theory in nonpolicy debate has contributed to difficulty for debaters and judges alike. The problem is especially apparent for second negative speakers in the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) format. The controversy over the direction and goals of CEDA style debate has led some members of the CEDA community to argue that values should be discussed and debated. Because of the difficulties in judging values in academic debates, several considerations should be kept in mind in formulating criteria for value implications, such as the use of situational perspectives, and whether the endorsement of the resolution would create competing or conflicting values. In addition, the negative team must indicate if the value implications occur in linear and incremental fashion or whether specific threshold/pressure points have to be reached. Three questions should also be considered in formulating standards for value implications: (1) if the affirmative justification and negative value implication are mutually exclusive; (2) if the value implication is unique to adoption of the resolution; and (3) if the value implication is a fair and typical representation which justifies rejection of the resolution. These criteria and standards should assist debaters and debate judges when values become the focus of a CEDA debate. (Eighteen references are appended.) (MS)

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CRITERIA AND STANDARDS FOR VALUE IMPLICATIONS

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CRITERIA AND STANDARDS FOR VALUE IMPLICATIONS

The lack of consistent theory in nonpolicy debate has contributed to difficulty for debaters and judges alike (Wenzel & Hample, 1975; Brownlee, 1982; Pierce, 1986; and Colbert, 1987). The problem is especially apparent for second negative speakers in the Cross Examination Debate Association format (CEDA). Some of these debaters argue policy disadvantages when no policy is being advocated by the affirmative team. Others label off-case arguments value objections without regard to whether or not the affirmative supports values in their case. While it is clear that a consistent framework is needed by these debaters to help delineate their speaker responsibilities, a controversy over the direction and goals of CEDA style debate contributes to the confusion.

Some members of the CEDA community believe the activity should be a forum where values are discussed and debated (Brydon, 1987). Others argue that value topics have appeared on every CEDA topic ballot since 1974, but for the most part, have not received sufficient support (votes) by the membership to be selected as CEDA resolutions (Winebrenner, 1987). A recent study by Brydon (1987) reported that 15 of 20 CEDA topics since 1974 may be classified as "quasi-policy" topics. Many of these topics could just as easily be considered "quasi-value" because their phrasing.

Is the phrasing of the resolution the only factor which

determines whether a debate focuses on value or policy implications? Often debate resolutions are not sufficiently explicit to conclude that policy or values must be the focus of the debate. For example, the first semester CEDA debate resolution from 1984-5, "Resolved: That the method of conducting Presidential elections in the United States is detrimental to democracy," might suggest focusing the debate on either policy and/or values. The term "method" could imply that specific policy considerations are appropriate, while the term "democracy" suggest that value implications could also be a central focus. Another example can be found in the Spring 1987 CEDA debate resolution, "Resolved: That regulations in the U.S. requiring employees to be tested for controlled substances are an unwarranted invasion of privacy." In this topic the policy implication is to do away with testing regulations, while there are also value implications regarding the right of privacy. Allen and Summors (1987) argue, "The specific wording or structure of the resolution is less important than the function of the resolution within the debate" (p. 2). In other words, resolutions may provide content, direction, and grounds which facilitate the debating process without necessarily specifying that value or policy is the central focus of the debate. Bartanen and Frank (1983) make the distinction that, "[p]olicy debate tends to center on the means and consequences of policy rather than the ends. In value debate, the focus should be on the ends of the policy or the principles of actions" (p.

410). Therefore, it is sometimes debatable if a resolution is more appropriately viewed from a values or policy perspective.

For those CEDA debaters who are inspired to discuss the implicit values on certain resolutions the results can range from being chastised by certain judges on ballots to confusion without theoretical guidelines. Some debate judges also experience difficulty in decision-making especially when off-case arguments are theoretically mislabeled or not applied.

Typically three approaches are used by CEDA second negative debaters for off-case arguments--disadvantages, counterwarrants, and value objections. A number of text books and journals have explicated the concept of disadvantage (Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Sheckels, 1984; Ulrich, 1985; and Pfau, 1987). Basically, a harm is linked to acceptance of a topical affirmative policy, and the impact of the disadvantage is weighed against the benefits of accepting the affirmative policy. The traditional problem-solution approach seems sufficient for policy debates but is seldom used in CEDA debates. Like a number of theoretical innovations the use of the traditional "stock issues" paradigm seems to be avoided in CEDA because of what may be termed "NDT stigma."

Another suggested method of arguing off-case in CEDA debates is the use of the counterwarrant (Tolbert & Hunt, 1985). While many good reasons for using counterwarrants in CEDA have been presented, it too may have suffer in part because of the perceived connection to NDT and policy debate.

Two advocates of counterwarrants in CEDA explain, "[t]he original focus of debate in CEDA was no doubt intended to be quite different than NDT" (Tolbert & Hunt, 1985). While counterwarrants could provide a fruitful perspective for nonpolicy debates, the time involved in establishing the theory and debunking the differences between policy and nonpolicy applications are too consuming for debaters to risk in competitive situations.

Both the disadvantage and counterwarrant seem to have legitimate applications on some CEDA resolutions but have not gained widespread acceptance in CEDA debates. Unfortunately a common practice in many CEDA debates is to label most any off-case argument a value objection (VO). Ironically, the term "value objection" adopted primarily through convention, is not considered by many to be an accurate description of what second negatives in CEDA often do. Perella (1987) explains:

> Almost invariably the negative is not really objecting to the affirmative value, but proposing other applications. For example, in a debate on 'Resolved: that this House supports feeding starving babies." the affirmative might take as criterion 'that which saves the starving is worthy of support.' No negative will truly object to the value of saving the starving, but may offer other pragmatic arguments against it. (p. 189-190)

Perella suggests the term "policy implication" may be more accurate in describing what the negative argument is really attempting to accomplish. Indeed, in many situations he is right, but Perella's terminology also associates CEDA to traditional policy debate and suggest that pragmatic harms are

weighed against affirmative values. The term "implication" is more precise in explicating what many CEDA debaters are attempting when they mislabel their off-case arguments value objections. Therefore, it might make sense to use the term "policy implication" when the focus of the off-case concerns pragmatic effects, and "value implication" when the off-case concerns competing values.

THE CONCEPT

Value implications VI(s) should dispute the affirmative justification as a proper warrant for the debate resolution when values become the focus of an academic debate. Church and Wilbanks (1986) observe, "values cannot be judged in isolation.... Values cannot be debated unless they are compared with other values... We can only judge values within a context of specific behaviors when one value conflicts with another" (p. 39). Thus, the implications of endorsing affirmative values are what CEDA second negatives should present, not arguments labeled value objections that do not directly reject the affirmative's value justification. If the affirmative argues that, "Resolved, U.S. intervention into the internal affairs of foreign governments violate the right of self-determination," the negative team could argue that unless the U.S. does intervene human rights would be threatened as a VI. This example illustrates how implict values can compete based on acceptance of a resolution--a governments right to self determination or the human rights of individuals. Although

this resolution also has policy implications and might be considered "quasi-policy" the values implicit within the resolution could also be a legitimate focus of a debate.

CRITERIA

At least three considerations should be made in formulating criteria for value implications. First, situational perspectives are especially useful when developing the implications of conflicting values. Our perception of values are often influenced by cultural, contextual, and time factors. Smith and Hunsaker (1972) point out, "values may conflict with each other; in wartime, the human life and the value of self-defense sometimes conflict with a value derived from a different drive: hunger conflicts with the value of a pleasant physical appearance..." (p. 23) Values are not static concepts, hence situational factors should be a part of criteria in developing VI(s).

Another obligation of formulating VI(s) is to demonstrate that endorsement of the resolution would create competing or conflicting values. The negative is obligated to provide a "link," similar to linking policy disadvantages. Would endorsement of the resolution or affirmative value lead to the demise of other values? While the process of linking VI(s) is similar to linking disadvantages to operational plans, VI(s) are instead associatated with the acceptance of the overall resolution. Considering the resolution holistically, is generally an accepted practice in CEDA debate (Biggers, 1987;

Tolbert & Hunt, 1985; and Ulrich, 1987). Biggers (1987) summarizes, "If the negative offers examples... [and] support the counter generalization, then we would reject the affirmative generalization and accept the counter generalization. In practical terms this would mean that we reject the truth of the resolution and accept its opposite or an alternative" (p. 490).

After the negative team links the VI(s) to the acceptance of the resolution, there is the additional burden of indicating if the VI(s) occur in linear and incremental fashion, or do specific threshold/pressure points have to be reached. Arguments like rights snowball, chilling effects, and domino theory suggest linear harms that increasingly reach an ultimate impact. The harm increases as movement in a specific direction occurs. Threshold impacts are different. There is no gradual building of the degree of impact--only the probability of occurrence. If the I.C.B.M. silos are emptied the impact of the act reaches threshold when the warheads hit the earth. It is important to establish the type (linear or threshold) of impact being argued early enough in the debate, so that differences between the affirmative justification and VI(s) may be carefully weighed for meaningful evaluation. In addition, it is important to determine if the effects of the value implications are reversible to weigh them against the resolution. Are the VI(s) permanent. The negative team, therefore, should associate harm to values resolutional acceptance and demonstrate how VI(s) outweigh the affirmative justification.

STANDARDS

At least three questions should be considered in formulating standards for value implications. 1) Is the affirmative justification and negative value implication mutually exclusive? 2) Is the value implication unique to adopting the resolution? 3) Is the value implication a fair and typical representation which justifies rejection of the resolution?

It is important to establish whether the VI(s) and the affirmative justification are mutually exclusive (can't coexist). If the VI(s) are mutually exclusive of and competes for existence with the affirmative justification then a decision of which team best justifies the decision making criterion can be reached. In this instance if the VI(s) outweigh the affirmative justification the negative team should win because the decision is limited to a choice between the two. However, if the VI(s) and the affirmative justification are not mutually exclusive, but still conflict, the degree of probability for each becomes important. How great are the risks of occurence for the affirmative justification and the VI(s)? Do the VI(s) have more probability of impact then the affirmative justification? A standard of probability or most likely outcome should be employed. Standards of possibility are seldom sufficient to reach a rational decision, and standards of certainty are seldom possible. A probability standard is useful to weigh competing values that are not entirely mutually exclusive. Resolving disputes between the justification and implications

is no by means an easy process, however, applying the concepts of mutual exclusiveness and probability can help to make the task less complicated.

A uniqueness standard for value implications also seems appropriate. If the VI(s) occur, whether or not the resolution is accepted, there is no unique reason to reject the resolution. Logically, we should not consider VI(s) if they occur with or without accepting the resolution. Thus, VI(s) should demonstrate harmful value implications that are intrinsic and unique to accepting the resolution or affirmative value.

Finally, a standard of representativeness should be required to prove a sufficient counter generalization. Perella (1987) says, "the negative may wish to introduce arguments which do not directly tie to the affirmative's case but which the judge should consider.... [I]t is important to know that on these [off-case] arguments the negative has the burden of proof..." (p. 81) Since the affirmative team is required to present a representative and typical case which inductively supports the resolution, the negative team should have a similar burden in presenting VI(s) or counter generalizations when attempting to independently reject the resolution. VI(s) should be typical and representative, or they would constitute a hasty generalization for rejecting the resolution. Hence, a standard of sufficient counter generalization for VI(s) assists in providing equity between the affirmative and negative teams.

CONCLUSIONS

The use of VI(s), as defined in this essay, can hopefully assist debaters and debate judges when values become the focus of a CEDA debate. Certainly, a number of policy and value paradigms exist which may be more fruitful on some topics. However, when quasi-policy/value topics are used and teams attempt to focus on values implicit within a resolution, VI(s) can provide a structural framework from which negative teams may view a resolution.

In addition, several important cognitive exercises are encouraged when negative teams develop this approach. Debaters must consider the underlying assumptions of resolutions. Debaters must use inferential reasoning by calling for an inductive leap from VI(s) to the affirmative justification and ultimately the resolution. This is important because conceptual frameworks, in general, assist in honing critical thinking skills. Meyers (1986) concludes:

> A specific perspective or framework for analyzing materials and issues in a discipline is an important cognitive element in critical thinking.... [T]eachers of critical thinking in any discipline must...provide--or give students the conceptual tools to develop--a basic framework for analysis of materials in that discipline (p. 8)

This essay has attempted to provide some of the concepts, criteria, and standards for debating value implications. While the author concedes that CEDA rarely chooses "value topics," it should be recognized that a strong interest to focus on the values implicit in "quasi-policy" resolutions exists. Perhaps

someday CEDA may shift its focus to policy paradigms or eventually vote for value topics. Until then, these basic guidelines may assist those who currently participate in CEDA activity.

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